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“Go¨del’s achievement in modern logic is singular and monumental . . . a
landmark that will remain visible far in space and time . . .The subject of logic
will never again be the same.”
(von Neumann)
1 Introduction
Kurt Go¨del is claimed by some to be the greatest logician since Aristotle.The ideas
that Go¨del is associated with in logic are the CompletenessTheoremwhich appeared
in his 1929 PhD thesis, but more particularly the IncompletenessTheorem (actually a
pair of theorems) and they both have been crucial in almost all theoretical areas of
20’th century logic since their inception. Whilst Frege’s keen insights into the nature
of quantifier ensured a great leap forward from the Syllogism, and his attempts to
formulate a conception of arithmetic purely as a logical construct, were ground-
breaking and influenced the course of the philosophy of mathematics in the late
19’th, and through Russell, in the early 20th century, and determined much of the
discourse of that period, ultimately it is Go¨del’s work that encapsulated the nature
of the relationship between deductive processes acting on symbolic systems, and the
nature of truth (or satisfaction), or more widely interpreted meaning or semantics
in the CompletenessTheorem. It is often said that the much deeper Incompleteness
Theorems that came a year later illustrated a limitation of the axiomaticmethod, and
in particular brought to a halt David Hilbert’s programme of putting mathematics
on a secure, finitistically provable, ground of consistency. It may even be true that
more ink and paper has been expended on the Incompleteness Theorem and its
consequences (imagined or otherwise) than any other theorem in mathematics.
We shall give an introductory account of these two theorems - but one should
be aware that Go¨del made significant contributions to other areas of logic (notably
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giving an interpretation of intuitionistic logic in the usual predicate logic) which we
do not cover here. Go¨del’s contributions to set theory (his hierarchy of constructible
sets with which he showed the consistency of the Axiom of Choice and the Contin-
uum Hypothesis, one might consider a form of ‘ramified’ or ‘iterated logic’) have
had almost as much foundational impact in set theory as the logical theorems re-
ferred to above have been in all areas of current logic. We do not cover these here
either.
2 The Completeness Theorem
We shall describe the CompletenessTheorem presently, but to set it in some context
we must see what people meant by “Logic”.
Russell and Whitehead in the Principia Mathematica (PM) had set up a deduc-
tive systemwhereby, as in the axiomatic system of Euclid, the concepts of the subject
under discussion, here of logic, and then it was hoped, also of arithmetic, could be
codified and reduced to a small number of self-evidently true postulates, and rules
of inferring from those postulates. What Russell meant by “logic” was perhaps not
entirely the same as what has come down to us as a “logic” in the 21st century. A
line in a deductive proof of the logical calculus of PM would be an interpreted for-
mula, about something, but in amodern deductive proof need not be so interpreted.
However Russell was trying to follow Frege and formulate such a system, ultimately
from which it hoped the laws of arithmetic could be derived.This latter aim is not
our concern here - merely the idea of a deductive system is what is important.
Thus, one might have a collection of axioms, or postulates, P say (which might
be PM), and onemay derive by applying one ormore ‘rules of deduction’ from a col-
lection R of rules, a particular proposition A, say. Now what exactly a ‘proposition’
is here, we can ignore (although Russell could not) because all that mattered later
was that there was some symbolic, or formal language in which the postulates, the
proposition A, and the intermediate propositions B, B, . . . , Bn could be written.
Here, the point was that Bn was the final proposition A and any Bi was either (i) a
postulate from the collection P or followed from one or more earlier propositions
on the list, by an application of a deductive rule from R. In modern notation this
state of affairs is rendered “⊢P A.”
What is allowed as “deductive rule”? This would have had a different answer
to different people in different eras. Bolzano took a “deductive rule” as one that
appealed to notions of truth, or something like meaning. For Frege and Russell de-
ductive rules should at least bemeaningful and preserve the truth of the consequent
A from the truth of the axioms P.
By the the time Go¨del emerged as graduate student in Vienna in the later 1920’s,
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Hilbert andAckermann [9] had codified a systemof deduction, the “restricted func-
tional calculus” which emerged from their deliberations on the deductive system of
PM.This could be applied to sets of postulates in a fixed type of language which we
now call a “first order language” and consisted of constant symbols, and symbols of
both functional and relational type that might be used to express possible functions
and relations amongst variables v, v, . . . . However it is important to note thatwhat
those variables will be interpreted as and what actual functions and relations those
functional and relational symbols denote play absolutely no part in this specifica-
tion whatsoever.The language is to be thought of as merely symbol strings, and the
“correct” or “well-formed” strings will constitute the relevant ‘formulae’ which we
shall work with. The rules determining the well-formed formulae are thus purely
syntactic.The set of derivation or deduction rules for determining which sequences
of formulae constituted permissible proofs had emerged from PM as we have men-
tioned, but the question of the correct set, or adequate set of rules had not been
settled. Hilbert had remarked that empirical experience with the rules then in use
seemed to indicate they were indeed adequate.The question was stated explicitly in
[9].
Hilbert had, over the previous decades, embarked on an ambitious scheme of
proving the consistency of all of mathematics. The motivation for this came from
the disturbances that the discovery by Russell of a ‘paradox’ in Frege’s system - really
a fundamental error or inconsistency in Frege’s basic conception, and the similar
‘paradoxes’ in set theory of Cantor, and Burali-Forti. We shall not discuss these
here, but only remark that Hilbert had envisaged a thorough-going rethinking of
mathematical axioms, and a program for showing the consistency of those axioms:
namely that one could not prove both A and its negation, ¬A, using rules from the
given set R. The danger had surfaced that set theory might be inconsistent and
whilst all of mathematics could be seen to be developed from set theory how could
we be sure that mathematics was safe from contradiction? Hilbert’s thinking on
this evolved over the first two decades of the 20th century and set out to reassure
mathematicians of the logical safety of their field. Hilbert had thus as part of the
programme, axiomatised geometry in a clear modern fashion, and had showed that
the problem of establishing the consistency of geometry could be reduced to the
problem of the consistency of analysis. Hilbert had thus founded the area which
later evolved into proof theory, being the mathematical study of proofs themselves,
which, as indicated above, were to be regarded as finite strings of marks on paper. It
was in this arena that the basic question of completeness of a set of rules had arisen.
What would be needed if a deductive system was to be useful was some reassur-
ance that a) deductive rules themselves could not introduce ‘falsity’ (in short: only
true statements could be deduced using the rules from postulates considered to be
true - this is the “soundness” of the system), and more pertinently b) that any “uni-
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versally valid” formula could in fact deduced. We have referred already to a) above,
and for the system derived from PM in [9] this was not hard to show. But what
about b) and what does it mean?
For a well-formed formula B to be universally valid would mean that whatever
domain of objects the variables were thought to range over, and whatever interpre-
tation was given to the relation and functions symbols of the language as actual re-
lations and functions on that domain, then the formula B would be seen to be true
with that givenmeaning. In modern parlance again, we should say that B is univer-
sally valid, or more simply just ‘true’ in every relevant domain of interpretation. In
modern notation, the idea that B is universally valid is written ⊧ B.
Given a set of sentences Γ of the language L one may also define the notion of
a formulae B being a logical consequence of Γ: in any domain of interpretation in
which all of Γ was satisfied or deemed to to be true, then so must also B be true.
Denoting this as Γ ⊧ B the CompletenessTheorem can be stated thus:
Theorem 2.1 Go¨del:The CompletenessTheorem (1929)[4]
For any first order language L and any sentence B of that language then:
⊢ B ⇐⇒ ⊧ B.
More generally for any further set of sentences Γ from L:
Γ ⊢ B ⇐⇒ Γ ⊧ B.
The (Ô⇒) direction of both statements represents the soundness thoorem of
the deductive system’s set of rules: if B is provable in the system then B would be
universally valid, that is, true in every interpretation. Similarly in the second part,
if B were provable from the assumptions Γ, then in any interpretation ofL in which
all the sentences of Γ were satisfied, (that is interpreted as true statements), B would
also have to be made true in that interpretation. A paraphrase is to regard the rules
as being truth-preserving. As an example let us take Γ as the set of axioms for group
theory in mathematics, with B some assertion in the appropriate language for this
theory.The SoundnessTheorem states that if B is derivable from the axioms using
the rules of inference, then in any structure in which the axioms Γ are true, i.e. in
any group, B will necessarily be true. This direction of the theorem was essentially
known in some form to Hilbert, Ackermann et al.
The harder, and novel, part is the implication (⇐Ô) which sometimes alone is
called the completeness (or adequacy) theorem. Taking the example of Γ the axioms
of group theory, if Γ ⊧ B, which asserts that if in any group B is satisfied, then the
conclusion Γ ⊢ B is read as saying that from the group axioms Γ, the statement B can
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be deduced.This is the sense of ‘completeness’: the rules of deduction are complete
or adequate, they are up to the task of deriving the validities of the system.
If one looks at the proof one can see how it goes beyond a very strictly finitary,
syntactically based argument. We shall see that the argument intrinsically involves
infinite sets. We give a modern version of the argument due to Henkin, and for
the sake of exposition assume first that the set of assumptions Γ is empty and con-
centrate on the first version. Suppose when trying to prove the (⇐Ô) direction,
we assume that B is not deducible: /⊢ B. We wish to show that B is not universally
valid and hence we seek an interpretation in which ¬B is satisfied.This suffices, as
no interpretation can satisfy both B and ¬B. We thus need a structure. In this ar-
gument one enlarges the language L to a language L′ by adding a countable set of
new constants c, c, . . . cn , . . . not in L. One enumerates the formulae of the lan-
guage as ',', . . .'k , . . . taking ¬B as '. One then builds up in an infinite series
of steps a collection of sentences ∆ = ⋃nPN ∆n. At the k’th stage, when defining
∆k one considers whether ∆k− ⊬ ¬'k . If this is the case, then 'k is added to ∆k−
to obtain ∆k , which by the case assumption, is not inconsistent. If this is not the
case then ¬'k is so added, and consistency is still maintained. Additionally, if 'k
is to be added and it is of the form Dvm (vm) then a new constant, not yet used so
far in the construction, cr say, is chosen and  (cr) is added as well. These are the
two essential features. For our discussion the first is notable: what one does is to
make an infinite sequence of choices whether to take 'k or ¬'k when building ∆.
We are thus picking an infinite branch through an implicitly defined infinite binary
branching tree - binary since we are making yes/no choices as to whether to add 'k
or ¬'k . To argue that such a branch must exist one appeals to Ko¨nig’s Tree Lemma:
any finitely branching infinite tree T must contain an infinite branch or path through
T.The second feature, the choice of constants cr allows us from the branch, that is
the sequence of formulae that make up ∆, to construct a structure whose domain
will be built from sets of constants. Because the set of constants is countably infinite,
the structure so built will also be countable - this will be important for considera-
tion below. These details and how the language L′ is interpreted in the resulting
structure will be suppressed here.
In the case that one starts from a set of sentences Γ and assumes Γ /⊢ B and
wishes to show Γ /⊧ B, one needs a structure in which all of Γ ∪ {¬B} is satisfied.
The process is the same as before but starting with ∆ as Γ ∪ {¬B}.
The crucial use of the Tree Lemma argument marks the step Go¨del took beyond
earlier work of Herbrand and Skolem. He saw that use could be made of this infini-
tary principle to construct a semantic structure. Two immediate corollaries can be
drawn from Go¨del’s argument:
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Theorem 2.2 (The Lo¨wenheim-SkolemTheorem) If Γ is a set of sentences in L that
is satisfiable in some structure then it is satisfiable in a countable structure.
The argument here is just the proof of the CompletenessTheorem itself: first if Γ is
satisfiable in some structure then it is consistent. Now build a structure using the
proof of the CompletenessTheorem starting from ∆ = Γ. In the resulting count-
able structure all of Γ will be true.
This theorem had been proven much earlier by the logicians after whom it is
named. Skolem’s 1923 argument had come quite close to proving a version of the
CompletenessTheorem. Later Go¨del said:
The CompletenessTheorem, mathematically, is indeed an almost triv-
ial consequence of Skolem 1923. However, the fact is that, at that time,
nobody (including Skolem himself) drew this conclusion neither from
Skolem 1923 nor, as I did, from similar considerations of his own.This
blindness (or prejudice, or whatever you may call it) of logicians is in-
deed surprising. But I think the explanation is not hard to find. It lies
in the widespread lack, at that time, of the required epistemological
attitude toward metamathematics and toward non-finitary reasoning
([8]).
The second Corollary is also a simple observation but apparently was unnoticed
by Go¨del and others for some years before it was explicitly stated.
Theorem 2.3 (The CompactnessTheorem) Suppose a set of sentences Γ of a first order
language L is not satisfiable in any structure.Then there is a finite subset Γ  Γ that
is inconsistent.
The argument here is that if Γ is not satisfiable, then no structure makes Γ true;
this implies “Γ ⊧ ∧¬” (interpretation: any structure thatmakes Γ true alsomakes
a contradiction true - and the latter can never happen). Hence by Completeness
Γ ⊢ ∧¬. But a proof of∧¬ fromassumptions in Γ is a finite list of formulae, and
so can only use a finite set Γ of assumptions from Γ.Thus Γ is a finite inconsistent
subset.
What we see here is that the inconsistency of the set Γ can always be localised to
a finite subset of sentences responsible for an inconsistency (of course there could
be infinitely many non-overlapping inconsistent finite subsets depending on what
Γ is).
Returning to the example of general theory above: then many such theories Γ
require an infinite set of axioms. If Γ ⊧ B, then we know that in any structure M
in which all of Γ is true, then B will be true.The Compactness argument shows that
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we don’t have to give one reason why in another structureM B is true, and another
reason for being true in structure M: because Γ ⊢ B, a finite subset Γ suffices as
assumptions to prove B, and the proof Γ ⊢ B gives us one single reason as to why
in any structure in which Γ is satisfied, B will be true.
2.1 In conclusion
To summarise: we now use the idea of a logicmore generally as a system comprising
three components: a syntactic component - of a languageL′ in some form, a deduc-
tive component of rules of inference that acts on the formulae of that language, and
a third very different semantic component: the notion of a structure or interpreta-
tion of the formulae of the language L′. It has become second nature for logicians
when studying the plethora of different logics to define such by reference to these
components. However it was theCompletenessTheorem that showed that, certainly
in the case of standard first order logic, the necessary interconnectedness of these
concepts for demonstrating the adequacy of the rules of inference.
Given a logic, one of the first questions one asks, is “Is it complete? Is there
a CompletenessTheorem for it?” For a host of logics, modal logics, logics of use
to computer science, ... completeness theorems are provable. For others they are
not and the reasons why not are themselves interesting. For so-called second or-
der logic where we allow the language to have quantifiers that range not over just
individuals but sets of individuals and relations between individuals, the logic is in-
complete: there is a deductive calculus for the logic but the lack of a Completeness
Theorem renders the logic intractable (apart from special cases or areas such as in
finite model theory) for proving useful theorems. It is partly for such reasons that
set theorists followed Skolem into formulating set theory and thinking and reason-
ing in first order logic, because there is a Completeness theorem and all the useful
model building tools (such as the Corollaries of the Lo¨wenheim-SkolemTheorem
and the CompactnessTheorem) that come with it.
Whilst theTheorem is nowadays not seen as at all difficult, Go¨del’s 1929 result
can be seen as distilling out exactly the relationship between the different threads
or components of first order logic; by answering Hilbert and Ackermann’s question
he demonstrated that semantical concepts, concepts of structure, satisfiability and
of truth in such structures, had to be brought in to answer the drier questions of
whether the rules of the deductive calculus which told only how strings of marks
on paper could be manipulated, were sufficient for producing all validities in struc-
tures satisfying a set of assumptions. It is not insignificant that the Tree Lemma
brought out what would otherwise have remained implicit and hidden: the nature
of the argument also required infinite sets. Indeed from our present vantage point
we know that the CompletenessTheoremmust use the Tree Lemma: if one assumes
7
the Completeness theorem then we can prove the Tree Lemma from it: they are thus
equivalent. But these discoveries were to come much later.
3 Incompleteness
To understand the IncompletenessTheorems we need to discuss further Hilbert’s
programmatic attempt to put mathematics on a consistent footing, by returning to
the position in the late 1920’s.
Hilbert had the belief that mathematics could be made secure from possible
paradoxes that dogged the early years of set theory, by means of a series of finitary
consistency proofs. A consistency proof for a theory T stated in a language L would
be some form of proof that one could not have T ⊢ '∧¬' for some (or any) formula
' of L. But what should count as a legitimate proof or argument that T was con-
sistent? To be of any value the argument had to use indubitably secure means, that
themselves were not open to question. Hence the notion of ‘finitary’. What Hilbert
meant by this term was never given an absolutely explicit definition by Hilbert or
his followers, even though the term was discussed by Hilbert on may occasions.
Hilbert divided mathematical thinking into the ‘real’ and the ‘ideal’.The former was
essentially the mathematics of number theory, and the subject matter was ‘finitist
objects’ the paradigm being stroke sequences “ ∣∣∣∣, . . . , ∣” representing numbers, to-
gether with simple repetitive operations performed on them. Hilbert formulated
various epistemological constraints on such objects, such as surveyability etc. Op-
erations on them (such as concatenation corresponding to addition) should again
be of a simple kind. The truth or otherwise of such finitarily expressed statements
was open to inspection as it were.
At a later stageHilbert andBernays used the idea of primitive recursion (a scheme
of building up number functions by simple recursion schemes) and forms of in-
duction that could be expressed in the language of arithmetic LA by quantifier free
formulae, stating that such should count as finitary. As a deeper discussion of what
constituted finitary methods would take us too far afield, we shall let the idea rest
with this version.
Ideal mathematics according to Hilbert could prove for us, for example, quan-
tified statements in number theory. But if we really were in possession of finitary
means for proving the consistency of that piece of idealised mathematics, we could
have confidence in the truth of that quantified number theoretical statement, in a
way that we could never have otherwise, because of the complexity involved in sur-
veying all the natural numbers required by the quantifiers. Hilbert is sometimes
paraphrased as saying that “consistency of a theory yields the existence of the math-
ematical objects about which it speaks.” But his intentions here were more nuanced,
8
and more restricted.
Hilbert had given a thorough-going axiomatisation of geometry in Foundations
of Geometry (1899).The consistency of the axioms of higher dimensional geometry
could be reduced to that of plane geometry alone, and in turn the latter could be
seen to be consistent by interpreting it in analysis, and thus as reducing the problem
to that of the consistency of analysis. Given the emergence of the set theoretical
paradoxes at the time, Hilbert wanted a proof of the consistency of analysis that was
direct and did not involve a reduction using, say Dedekind cuts of sets of reals (as
this might be in danger of importing unsafe methods). In his 1900 problems list, at
second place he gave this consistency problem for analysis.
Hilbert’s thinking was that the logical system of Principia Mathematica was in-
adequate for their purposes and so developed a new calculus for logical expressions
(the  -calculus). In 1924 Ackermann developed an argument for the consistency of
analysis, but von Neumann who took a deep interest in the foundations of math-
ematics at that time (formulating an axiomatic set theory, and the notion of ‘von
Neumann ordinal’ number) saw an error. By the late 1920’s Ackermann had devel-
oped a new -substitution method and there was optimism that with this, a new
consistency proof for analysis given in this calculus could be given. This was even
announced byHilbert at the 1929 International Congress ofMathematics. But it was
to be short-lived.
3.1 Go¨del’s First Incompleteness Theorem
Go¨del worked in Vienna, and quite independently of Hilbert’s Go¨ttingen school. He
expressed surprise concerning attempts at proving the consistency of analysis.
It is mysterious why Hilbert wanted to prove directly the consistency
of analysis by finitary methods. I saw two distinguishable problems:
to prove the consistency of number theory by finitary number theory
and to prove the consistency of analysis by number theory . . . Since
the domain of finitary number theory was not well-defined, I began by
tackling the second half . . . I represented real numbers by predicates in
number theory . . . and found that I had to use the concept of truth (for
number theory) to verify the axioms of analysis. By an enumeration
of symbols, sentences and proofs within the given system, I quickly
discovered that the concept of arithmetic truth cannot be defined in
arithmetic. If it were possible to define truth in the system itself, we
would have something like the liar paradox, showing the system to be
inconsistent . . . Note that this argument can be formalized to show the
existence of undecidable propositionswithout giving any individual in-
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stances. (If there were no undecidable propositions, all (and only) true
propositions would be provable within the system. But then we would
have a contradiction.) . . . In contrast to truth, provability in a given for-
mal system is an explicit combinatorial property of certain sentences of
the system, which is formally specifiable by suitable elementary means
. . . (in [15])
In September of 1930 there was to be a joint meeting of several academic soci-
eties in Ko¨nigsberg. Variousmembers of theWienerkreis, Carnap, Feigl,Waismann
would speak at the Conference on Epistemology of Exact Sciences. Hilbert would
attend and deliver his farewell address as President of the German Mathematical
Union. At the first meeting Carnap, Heyting and von Neumann would give hour
addresses on logicism, intuitionism and formalism respectively. Go¨del was to give
a short contributed talk on results relating to his thesis. A few days before Go¨del
met Carnap in a cafe to discuss the trip and then out of the blue, related to Carnap
his theorem concerning incompleteness of systems similar to PM. It seems that al-
though Carnap noted in amemorandum “Go¨del ’s discovery: incompleteness of the
system of PM, difficulty of the consistency proof ”, he could not have understood
exactly what Go¨del had achieved. He met Go¨del three days later for a further dis-
cussion, but a week later in Ko¨nigsberg, he would still in the ensuing discussions
emphasise the role of completeness of a system being an overriding criterion for a
formal theory.
Let us suppose a formal system P has sufficient syntax to talk about numerals
‘’, ‘’, . . . ‘k’, . . . (as names for the corresponding actual numbers) as well as symbols
for some basic arithmetical operations such as the successor operation of adding
one, x+, addition andmultiplication in general.The system embodied in Principia
Mathematica is such a system. Also the Dedekind-Peano axioms for number theory
(“PA”) are expressed in such a language and moreover adopt axioms that allow the
use of such operations with their normal properties, together with the notion of
mathematical induction.
A formal theory P is called!-consistent, if whenever we have that P proves all of
'(‘’),'(‘’), . . . ,'(‘k’), . . . in turn, then it is not the case that P proves Dv¬'(v).
Because of the infinite hypothesis here, this is a stronger requirement on a theory P
than simple consistency alone.
Theorem 3.1 (Go¨del: The First Incompleteness Theorem (1930) [5]) Let P be
a formal theory such as that of PrincipiaMathematica expressed in a suitable languageL. If the theory P is !-consistent, then there is a sentence P of L such that:
P ⊬ P and P ⊬ ¬P
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The existence of such a sentence P (a ‘Go¨del sentence’ for the system P) shows
that P cannot derive any sentence or its negation whatsoever. The system is ‘in-
complete’ for deciding between P and ¬P . If the sentence P is purely a number-
theoretic statement then the conclusion is that there will be sentences which are
presumably true of false of the natural number structure (as the case may be) but
the system P is necessarily incapable of deriving either. If some version of ‘ideal’
mathematics could decide between the two, then that ideal mathematical argument
could not be given within the formal system P.
Go¨del said nothing about the Incompleteness results during his own talk in
Ko¨nigsberg, and only mentioned them in a rather casual manner during a round-
table discussion on the main talks that took place on the last day of the conference.
Hilbert was attending the conference and would give his farewell address as Pres-
ident of the German Mathematical Union, but did not attend the session at which
Go¨del made his remarks. It may well have been the case that, with the exception of
von Neumann, no one in the room would have understood Go¨del’s ideas. However
von Neumann realised immediately the import of Go¨del’s result.
We discuss here the proof of the theorem, which proceeded via a method of en-
coding numerals, then formulae, then finite sequences of formulae (which might
constitute a proof in the system P) all by numbers.This coding has become known
as “Go¨del coding (or numbering)” and when a numeral ‘k’ for the number k is in-
serted into a formula '(v), resulting in '(‘k’), then the latter can be said to be
assigning the property expressed by ' to the number k (the which may encode a
certain proof, for example). Thus indirectly formulae within the language can talk
about properties of other formulae, and properties of sequences of formulae, and so
forth, via this coding.
How the coding is arranged is rather unimportant as long as certain simplicity
criteria are met. It is common to use prime numbers for this. Suppose the lan-
guageL is made up from a symbol list: (, ), , S ,+,, =,¬,∧,→, D, v, v, . . . , vk , . . .
(where S denotes the successor function, and there is an infinite list of variables vk
etc.) Tomembers on the list we respectively assign code numbers: , , . . . , , , , +
k (for k P N). (Hence the variable v receives code number  +  = .) For the
symbol s let c(s) be its code in the above assignment.
A string such as: Dv( = S(v)) expresses (the false) statement that some num-
ber’s successor is . In general a string of symbols ss⋯sk from the above list can
be coded by a single number:
c(ss⋯sk) = c(s).c(s).⋯.pc(sk)k
where pm is the m’th prime number.
Given a number, by computing its prime factors we can ascertain whether it is
a) a code number of a proof, or b) of a formula, or c) of just a single symbol, and
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moreover, which symbol, formula, or proof, in a completely algorithmic fashion.
The number 2 has the numeral term or name: S(S(0)) from L and we abbreviate the
latter as ‘’.
We shall write ‘'’ for the numeral of the code number of the formula '. ‘'’
functions thus as a name for '. Then the formula  = S() has as code: c( =
S()) = ...... Suppose the latter value is k say, then ‘ = S()’ is
‘k’. The efficiency of the coding system is entirely irrelevant: we only require the
simple algorithmicity of the coding processes that map the syntax of the language
in a (1-1) fashion into N in a recoverable fashion. Those codes are then named by
the appropriate numerals which are terms in L.
A further minimal requirement on the formal system P is that it be sufficiently
strong to be able to represent predicates or properties of natural numbers which are
definable over the standard structure. By this ismeant the following: let'(v, . . . , vk)
be any formula. P represents ' if for all natural numbers n, . . . , nk both of the fol-
lowing hold:
N ⊧ '[n, . . . , nk]⇒ P ⊢ '(‘n’, . . . , ‘nk ’);
N ⊭ '[n, . . . , nk]⇒ P ⊬ '(‘n’, . . . , ‘nk ’).
Onemay show that any primitive recursive (p.r.) predicate, asmentioned above,
can be represented in a system such as PM. Go¨del then developed a series of lemmas
that showed that operations on syntax could bemimicked by p.r. operations on their
code numbers. For example, there is a p.r. predicateR∧(v, v, v) so that if is'∧ ,
then in P we may prove R∧(‘'’, ’, ‘’). This is merely a reflection of the fact that
we can calculate a code number for  once those for ' and  are given. Ultimately
though, the fact that R∧(‘'’, ‘ ’, ‘’) may hold is because of certain arithmetical
relationships between the code numbers, not because of any ‘meaning’ associated to
those numbers (which we attribute to them because they code particular formulae).
Similarly if we have three formulae , , and  happens to be the formula
 → , then we could view this triple if it occurred in a list of formulae which may
or may not constitute a derivation in P, that they stand in for a correct application
of Modus Ponens on the first two formulae yielding the third. Go¨del shows that the
relation PMP(v, v, v) which holds of a triple of numbers as above if indeed that
third follows by application to the first two in the appropriate order, is primitive
recursive: then we have:
N ⊧ PMP[c('), c('→ ), c()], and hence P ⊢ PMP(‘'’, ‘'→ ’, ‘’).
In short, syntactic operations, the checking of formulae for correct formation,
and substitution of terms for variables, etc., up to the concept of the checking of a
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number that codes a list of formulae whether that list constitutes a correct proof of
the last formula of the list, these are all p.r. relations of the code numbers concerned.
For the last then Go¨del constructs a p.r. predicate Prf(v, v) which is intended to
represent in P (in the above sense)
“v is the code number of a proof of the last formula which has code number v.”
If then, k is the code number of a correct proof in P of the last formula  of the
proof, then the number relation Prf[k, c()] holds, and indeed is itself a relation
between numbers, moreover it is provable in P because P can represent any p.r.
predicate: P ⊢ Prf(‘k’, ‘’). Again, to repeat, the fact that Prf(x , y) holds just says
something about a particular numerical relationship between x and y, which either
holds (or does not) irrespective of the interpretation we may put on it in terms of
formulae, correct proofs, etc., etc.
Having done this, DvPrf(v, v) is naturally interpreted as “There is a proof of
the formulawith code number v.”This existential statementwe abbreviate Prov(v).
This final relation, due to the existential quantifier turns out not now to be p.r., but
this does not matter.
Lemma 3.2 (The diagonal lemma) Given any formula '(v) of the number theo-
retic language we may find a sentence  so that P ⊢ ↔ '(‘’).
Proof: We let se be the string with code e, thus c(se) = e. Define the function
r ∶NNÐ→N by:
(1) r(e , n) = c(@v(v =‘e’Ð→ sn)).
Then r(e , n) is p.r. being a composition of simple p.r. functions, indeed just mul-
tiplications involving some primes, the number n, and the codes for the symbols
S ,@, =,→ etc. occurring in the string @v(v =‘e’Ð→ sn).
This entails inter alia, that r is representable in P. We now define a diagonal
function d ∶ N Ð→ N by d(e) = r(e , e). Then d is p.r. and so representable too:
there is a formula D(v, v) that represents the graph of d as above. Moreover it can
be shown:
(2) P ⊢ @v(D(‘n’, v)←→ v = ‘d(n)’).
Given our ' let  (v) be Dv(D(v, v) ∧ '(v)). Let h = c( (v)). Then, to
spell it out: sh is  (v). Let  be @v(v =‘h’Ð→ sh). Then by our definition of sh:
P ⊢  ←→ @v(v =‘h’Ð→  (v))
by logic: ←→  (‘h’)
Using (2), Def of  : ←→ '(‘d(h)’)
But ‘’ is ‘d(h)’, so we are done. Q.E.D.
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The lemma, despite its construction, is less mysterious than it seems: it is just
a fixed point construction. Indeed there is nothing terribly particular about the
choice of : one may show for each choice of ' that there are in fact infinitely many
different formulae ′ satisfying the lemma: the argument has just provided one of
them. One should note however that the proof is completely constructive (and can
be run in intuitionistic logic): a  is given, together with a proof that it satisfies the
biconditional.
We can immediately derive a corollary which is often referred to as that “truth
is undefinable.” What this means is that there is no formula of the language (v)
for which we have that for any k: N ⊧ (‘k’) if and only ifN ⊧  where c() = k.
For, assume the axioms of P are true in N. Suppose  were such formula, thence
we should have by applying the Diagonal Lemma to the formula ¬(v), and then
SoundnessTheorem, that there is some sentence :
N ⊧ ↔ ¬(‘’). (∗∗)
However this  is like a liar sentence: for if it is true in N, then so is ¬(‘’); but by
the assumption on  then we also have N ⊧ (‘’). But by Soundness then ¬(‘’)
is also true of the natural numbers, which is absurd! Hence ¬ is true in N; but this
immediately leads to the same form of contradiction. Hence there is no such for-
mula (v). We have shown that the set of arithmetical truths is not arithmetically
definable:
Corollary 3.3 (Tarski: The Undefinability of Truth) There is no formula (v)
ofL for which we have that for any k: P ⊢ (‘k’) if and only ifN ⊧  where c() = k.
This theorem, usually attributed to Tarski, is easier to establish than the Incom-
pletenessTheorem to come, and seems to have been also known to Go¨del (see the
quotation at the beginning of this section). Go¨del seems to have come to the reali-
sation that an IncompletenessTheorem would be provable precisely because prov-
ability within a formal system such as P was, unlike truth, representable within P.
That was the key.
In the proof ofTheorem 3.1 we shall apply it with ¬DvoPrf(v, v) as '. This
yields
P ⊢  ↔ ¬DvoPrf(v, ‘’) (∗)
We emphasise once more that the diagonal lemma says nothing about truth or
meaning or satisfaction in the structureN: it says something only about provability
of certain formulae in the formal system P, formulae which express certain equiva-
lences between sentences and formulae containing certain numeral terms. And that
holds for the expression (∗) too.
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Proof ofTheorem 3.1
Suppose  is as at (∗) above. Suppose for a contradiction that P ⊢ . Let n
be the code number of such a proof. Combining that proof with (∗) yields that
P ⊢ ¬DvoPrf(v, ‘’). However n is after all a code of a proof of  and as P represents
Prf , then P ⊢ Prf(‘n’, ‘‘).The conclusions of the last two sentences imply that P is
inconsistent.This is a contradiction. Hence P ⊬ .
Now from the last statement we conclude that no natural number n is a code of
a proof of  in P. Hence, as P represents Prf , we have for all n: P ⊢ ¬ Pr f (‘n’, ‘’).
The assumption of !-consistency now requires that P ⊬ ¬ Q.E.D.
Note that the assumption of !-consistency of P is only deployed in the second
part of the argument to show P ⊬ ¬. Rosser later showed how to reduce this as-
sumption to that of ordinary consistency by the clever trick of applying theDiagonal
Lemma to the formula
“@v(¬ Pr f (v, v) ∨ Dv(vis the code of a shorter proof than v of the formula ¬v)).”
Another remark: it is often asserted that the IncompletenessTheorem states that
“there are true sentences (in arithmetic, or in a formal theory, or in . . .) that are not
provable”. This is not a strictly accurate account of the theorem: the theorem itself
mentions only deduction in formal theories and says nothing about truth. However
the Go¨del sentence  is indeed true if we assume the consistency of P: by assuming
the consistency of P we concluded that P ⊬ , that is ¬DvoPrf(v, ‘’) is true, which
of course is  itself. We thus have “Con(P) ⇒ .” But note this is not (yet) an
argument within the deductive system P.
Yet another remark: the use of the self-referential Go¨del sentence  that asserts
its own unprovability sometimes leads to the impression that all undecidable state-
ments unprovable in such a theory as PM must of necessity have some degree of
self-reference. However this is false. We comment on this again below. Similarly we
do not refer to theGo¨del sentence  for PM, since one can show there are infinitely
many such.
3.2 The Second Incompleteness Theorem
Von Neumann left the room in Ko¨nigsberg realising the import of what Go¨del had
achieved. He may have been the only person to do so: Hans Hahn, Go¨del ’s the-
sis supervisor and who was present, made no mention of the Incompleteness re-
sults. Neither the transcript of the session, nor the subsequent summary prepared
byReichenbach for publicationmade anymention even ofGo¨del’s participation. Al-
though Go¨del attended Hilbert’s lecture, the two never met (or corresponded later),
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and the Viennese party then returned home. If von Neumann approached Hilbert
whilst at the meeting to appraise him of the results, then it was not recorded.
Von Neumann shortly realised that more could be obtained by these methods.
We can express the consistency of the formal system P by the assertion that from
P we cannot prove a contradiction,  =  say. We thus let Con(P) be the sentence¬Dv Pr f (v, ‘ = ’).
Theorem 3.4 (Go¨del Second Incompleteness Theorem) Let P be a formal sys-
tem as above.Then P ⊬ Con(P).
Proof:The essence of the argument is thatwemay formalise the argument of “Con(P)⇒
” at the end of the last section in number theory, and so in a system such as P. We
should thus have shown
P ⊢ Con(P)→  . (∗∗)
We know from the First IncompletenessTheorem that P ⊬ . Hence P ⊬ Con(P).
Q.E.D.
Von Neumann realised that the something akin to the Second Incompleteness
Theorem would follow by the same methods Go¨del had used for the First, and in
th November after Ko¨nigsburg, wrote to Go¨del. However Go¨del had himself al-
ready realised this and submitted the SecondTheorem for publication in October.
Of course the above is extremely sketchy: the devil then is in the detail of how to for-
malise within the theory P, the inference above from Con(P) to ¬DvoPrf(v, ‘’),
we thus need to show “P ⊢ Con(P) implies P ⊢ ¬DvoPrf(v, ‘’)” within P itself.
Go¨del did not publish these rather lengthy details himself, they were first worked
out by Hilbert & Bernays in 1939 ([11]).
4 The Sequel
There aremany points of interest and possibilities for elaboration in these theorems,
and hence the extensive academic literature on them. Go¨del left deliberately vague
what he meant by ‘formal system’. He said at the time that it was not clear what a
formal system was or how it could be delineated. He stated his theorems as being
true in the system of PM and for “related systems”. It was clear that a similar system
that had sufficient strength to prove the arithmetical facts needed in the coding and
deduction processes would do. Hence the theorems were more general than had
they been restricted to just PM. It was left to Alan Turing [14] five years later to give
a mathematical definition of ‘computable’ that could be used to demarcate what a
formal system was: a set of axioms and rules that could be ‘recognised’ by a Turing
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machine, and so that a programmed machine could decide whether a derivation in
the system was correct. In the intervening period Go¨del had speculated on what an
‘effectively given’ formal system could subsist, and rejected proposals from Church
for such. However he recognised that what Turing proposed was definitive:
“When I first published my paper about undecidable propositions
the result could not be pronounced in this generality, because for the
notions of mechanical procedure and of formal system no mathemati-
cally satisfactory definition had been given at that time . . .The essential
point is to define what a procedure is.”
“That this really is the correct definition of mechanical computability
was established beyond any doubt by Turing.” ([6])
We give now a more modern statement of the First IncompletenessTheorem.
Theorem 4.1 (Go¨del; First Incompleteness Theorem) Let P be a computable set
of axioms for number theory that contain the axioms PA. Then if P is consistent, it
must be incomplete: there is a sentence P so that P ⊬ P and P ⊬ ¬P .
4.1 Consequences forHilbert’s program.
The most dramatic consequences of the theorems were for Hilbert’s program of
establishing the consistency of mathematics, and in particular focussing on arith-
metic, by ‘finitarymeans’. As we have discussed above finitarymethods were to be of
a restricted kind: the writing of, and operations on, finite strings of marks on paper,
and using intuitive reasoning that “includes recursion and intuitive induction for
finite existing totalities,” (Hilbert in a 1922 lecture). However finitary reasoning was
also left somewhat vague, but clearly the usual arithmetical operations on numbers
(and this for him included exponentiation) counted as finitary. [10] seems to have
settled on primitive recursive arithmetic, PRA, which allows the definition of func-
tions by primitive recursion schemes, and induction on quantifier free formulae.
If this constituted the ‘finitary means’ of Hilbert, then indeed the Incompleteness
Theorems dealt a death blow to this program. Von Neumann thought so, andWeyl,
writing in his 1943 obituary of Hilbert described it as a “catastrophe.” Go¨del was
initially more circumspect: he did not consider at that time that it had been argued
that all methods of a ‘finitary’ nature could be formalised in, say, PM. At a meeting
of the Vienna Circle in January 1931 he said that he thought that von Neumann’s
assertion that all finitary means could be effected in one formal system (and thus
the IncompletenessTheorems should have the devastating effect on Hilbert’s pro-
gramme) was the weak point in von Neumann’s argumentation. Again in his 1931
paper Go¨del wrote that there might be finitary proofs that could not be written in a
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formal system such as PM. It was hard to bring forward convincing arguments in
either direction at this point: there was no clear notion of ‘formal system’ - this had
to wait until 1936 for Turing - and there was also something of a confusion about
intuitionistic logic: both von Neumann and Go¨del thought that intuitionistic logic
could count as finitary reasoning. However this turned not to be the case: in 1933
Go¨del showed that classical arithmetic could be interpreted in the intuitionistic ver-
sion (known as Heyting Arithmetic HA and which only uses intuitionistic axioms
of logic and rules of inference), thus ruling out the idea of using intuitionistic logic
to help codify finitary reasoning, since the consistency ofHA alone would now give
the consistency of PA.
However by 1933 ([7]) he had changed his mind and acknowledged that all fini-
tary reasoning could indeed be formalised in the axiom system of Peano Arithmetic
(“PA”) which in particular allowedmathematical induction for formulaewith quan-
tifiers. He later remarked in several places (as in the quotation above) that Turing’s
precise definition of a formal system convinced him that the IncompletenessTheo-
rems refuted Hilbert’s programme.
4.2 SalvagingHilbert’s program
It was not recorded when precisely Hilbert he learnt of the Incompleteness results is
not recorded. Bernays, when he had previously suggested to Hilbert that after all a
completeness proof might not be possible, reported that Hilbert reacted with anger,
as he ddi to the results themselves. Nevertheless attempts were made to recover as
much of the program as was consistent with the IncompletenessTheorems. Bernays
(who also in correspondence to Go¨del indicated that he was also not convinced that
all finitary reasoning could be captured by a single system) in particular sought to
discover modes of reasoning that could count as finitary but avoid being captured
by the formal systems of the kind Go¨del discussed. Hilbert and Bernays soon af-
terwards reacted positively by trying to see what could be done. By 1931 Hilbert
was suggesting that an ‘!-rule’ might be deployed where from an infinite set of de-
ductions proving P(), P(), . . . , P(n), . . . one would be allowed to infer @kP(k)
might be permissible as a form of reasoning. It is unknown whether Hilbert was
reacting directly to the hypothesis of !-consistency in the first version of the First
IncompletenessTheorem, since indeed the displayed Go¨del sentence was a pure @
sentence which would be “proved” if the !-rule were allowed. But the rule itself was
not perceived as being finitary.
However the major and most striking advance here came fromG. Gentzen who
showed that the consistency of PeanoArithmetic could be established after all, if one
allowed inductions along well orderings up to the first “epsilon number” ( - the
first fixed point of the ordinal exponentiation function  → !). Clearly these are
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not finitary operations in any strict sense, but nevertheless Gentzen’s work opened
a whole area of logical investigation of formal systems involving such transfinite
inductions - thus opening the area of proof theory and ‘ordinal notation systems.’
(Gentzen also had the result exactly right: inductions bounded below  would not
have sufficed.)
4.3 After Incompleteness
Had the Hilbert Program succeeded, it would be showing that ideal mathematics
could be reduced to finitary ‘real’ mathematics: the consistency of a piece of ideal
mathematics could be shown using just real, finitistic mathematical methods. A rel-
ativized Hilbert program seeks to reduce an area of classical mathematics to some
theory, necessarily stronger than finitary mathematics. Feferman has argued that
most of mathematics needed for physics, for example, can be reduced to predica-
tive systems which can be proof-theoretically characterised using ordinal notation
systems albeit longer than , but still of a small or manageable length.
As the Second IncompletenessTheorem had shown, given a formal theory T
(such as PA) we have that T ⊬ Con(T). But we may add Con(T) as a new axiom
itself to T thereby obtaining a somewhat stronger deductive theory. (It is not that
theTheorem casts any doubt on the theory T or its consistency, it is only that it
demonstrates the impossibility of formalising a proof of that consistency within T.)
Thus we may set:
T ∶ T +Con(T)
the thinking is that since we accept PA and believe that its axioms are true of the
natural number structure, we should also accept that PA is consistent. (Whilst a
T, if consistent, neither proves Con(T) nor its negation, it would be presumably
perverse to claim that ¬Con(T) is the correct choice of the two to make here.)
Continuing, we may define:
Tk+ ∶ Tk +Con(Tk) for k < !, and then: T! = ⋃
k<! Tk .
Having collected all these theories together as T! , we might continue:
T!+ = T! +Con(T!) etc.
We thus obtain a transfinite hierarchy of theories. What can one in general prove
from a theory in this sequence? Turing called these theories “Ordinal Logics” and
was the first to investigate the question as to what extent such a sequence could be
considered complete:
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Question: Can it be that for any problem, or arithmetical statement A there might
be an ordinal  so that T proves A or ¬A? And if so can this lead to new knowledge
of arithmetical facts?
Such a question is necessarily somewhat vaguely put, but anyone who has con-
sidered the Second IncompletenessTheorem comes around to asking similar or re-
lated questions as these. The difficulty with answering this, is that much has been
swept under the carpet by talking rather loosely of ‘T’ for  ≥ !. This is a subtle
matter, but there seems no really meaningful way to arrive at further arithmetical
truths. Such iterated consistency theories have beenmuch studied by Feferman and
his school (see Franzen [2]).
Lastly we consider the question of Go¨del sentences themselves. Much has been
studied and written on this theme alone. However the use of the diagonal lemma
leading to the self-referential nature of such a Go¨del sentence gives a contrived feel-
ing to the sentence. (One should also beware the fact that not any fixed point of a
formula '(v) is necessarily stating that it says of itself that it satisfies '.) Could
there be propositions that were more genuinely mathematical statements, and were
not decided by PA? Go¨del’s methods produced only sentences of the diagonal kind,
and the problem was remarkably difficult. Some 40 years were to pass before the
first example was found by Paris andHarrington (concerning so-called Ramsey-like
partition principles). Since thenmanymore examples of mathematically interesting
sentences independent of PA have been discovered.
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